The Supreme Court of India’s Interpretation of Article 324 and its emphasis on more independent selection process of Election Commissioners and proposed selection process.

In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court of India safeguarding the Election Commission of India's independence and integrity. The case, Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, centered around Article 324 of the Constitution, which empowers the Executive to appoint Election Commissioners. However, this power has been exercised without a clearly defined procedure, prompting concerns about potential bias and undermining the integrity of elections.

The Court's judgment underscores the paramount importance of an independent Election Commission in a robust democracy. Free and fair elections are deemed non-negotiable, and the Election Commission plays a pivotal role in ensuring their conduct.

The judgment embarks on a comprehensive examination of Article 324, tracing its historical context and analyzing its interpretations and amendments over the years. This exploration sheds light on the intent behind Article 324 and its importance in the Indian constitutional framework.

Furthermore, the judgment delves into past instances where the Supreme Court has stepped in to provide guidelines and frameworks in the absence of specific legislation, especially in areas concerning fundamental rights. These instances often involved situations where legislative inaction created a vacuum that the Court deemed necessary to fill. Notable examples include establishing guidelines for the Central Bureau of Investigation's autonomy (CBI), ensuring the prevention of sexual harassment at workplaces, and recommending police reforms.

The Court emphasizes the extensive authority vested in the Election Commission, encompassing the supervision of elections and the enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct. Given these significant powers, the judgment stresses the need to insulate the Commission from any appearance of external influence or bias. It contends that the lack of a transparent and robust appointment process renders the Commission susceptible to such perceptions, which, in turn, could erode public trust in the electoral system.

The judgment explicitly criticizes the present ad-hoc appointment system, expressing concerns about its susceptibility to executive influence. This concern is further compounded by the absence of a fixed tenure for Election Commissioners, making them dependent on the Executive's discretion and potentially impacting their ability to perform their duties without fear or favor.

While acknowledging the legislature's role in enacting a comprehensive law, the Court asserts its authority to formulate interim guidelines for Election Commissioner appointments. Drawing parallels with the appointment processes for crucial positions like the Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and members of the Lokpal (anti-corruption ombudsman), the judgment advocates for a selection committee comprising high-ranking officials.

Consequently, the Court's judgment mandates the establishment of a selection committee to ensure a more independent and robust appointment process for the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners.
This committee would consist of:
• The Prime Minister
• The Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament)
• The Chief Justice of India

Although the judgment leaves room for Parliament to enact a comprehensive law concerning these appointments. However, until such legislation is passed, the guidelines outlined in the judgment will remain in effect, and in conclusion of the judgement the following is held: It is held by Justice K.M. Joseph, Justice Aniruddha Bose, Justice Hrishikesh Roy & Justice C. T. Ravikumar:
“We declare that as far as appointment to the posts of Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commissioners are concerned, the same shall be done by the President of India on the basis of the advice tendered by a Committee consisting of the Prime Minister of India, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and, in case, there is no such Leader, the Leader of the largest Party in the Opposition in the Lok Sabha having the largest numerical strength, and the Chief Justice of India.”

It is held by Justice Ajay Rastogi:
“126. Until the Parliament makes a law in consonance with Article 324(2) of the Constitution, the following guidelines shall be in effect: (1) We declare that the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commissioners shall be made on the recommendations made by a three-member Committee comprising of the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition of the Lok Sabha and in case no Leader of Opposition is available, the Leader of the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha in terms of numerical strength and the Chief Justice of India. (2) It is desirable that the grounds of removal of the Election Commissioners shall be the same as that of the Chief Election Commissioner that is on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court subject to the “recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner” as provided under the second proviso to Article 324(5) of the Constitution of India.”

This landmark decision signifies a crucial stride towards bolstering the Election Commission's autonomy, thereby fortifying the integrity of India's democratic processes.

Writ Petition (Civil) No.104 Of 2015
Between: Anoop Baranwal Vs Union of India
Coram: Justice K.M. Joseph, Justice Aniruddha Bose, Justice Hrishikesh Roy & Justice C. T. Ravikumar, Justice Ajay Rastogi.
Date: 02-03-2023