The Supreme Court of India declared Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, which mandated the death penalty for murder committed by life convicts, unconstitutional. Discover the key arguments and implications of this historic ruling from 1983.

This judgment in "Mithu etf vs. State of Punjab etc", analyzes whether Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which mandates the death penalty for murder committed by a life convict, violates Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court finds Section 303 to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of India reached a verdict on April 7, 1983, in the case of Mithu vs. State of Punjab, declaring Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) unconstitutional and void. The judgment, delivered by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud with Justice Chinnappa Reddy concurring, found Section 303 to be in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.

The Court observes that, "The procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary." It argues that while the death penalty was upheld in Bachan Singh as a constitutional punishment for murder, this ruling hinged on the sentence being an alternative to life imprisonment, with the normal sentence for murder being life imprisonment.
Section 303 IPC, however, mandates the death penalty for murder committed by a life convict, removing judicial discretion in sentencing. This lack of judicial discretion makes the right of the accused to be heard on the question of sentencing, as per Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a “meaningless ritual.”

The Court argues that classifying those who commit murder while serving a life sentence separately from other murderers, in order to mandate the death penalty, lacks rational justification. It examines if this classification is reasonable in cases where the murder occurs within prison and where it happens outside of prison (while the life convict is on parole or bail). It finds that in both situations, factors such as the circumstances of the crime, motivation, and potential mitigating circumstances are relevant in sentencing. Ignoring these factors in favor of a mandatory death sentence is deemed "harsh, unjust, and unfair."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court also refutes the logic of differentiating between someone who commits murder after completing a life sentence and someone who commits murder while serving a life sentence for the purpose of sentencing. The former is not entitled to preferential treatment over the latter merely because they completed their previous sentence. It highlights the "extraordinary strains and pressures" faced by those serving life sentences, making it unreasonable to discriminate against them compared to other convicts, including those who have completed their sentences.

Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, and the Court found no rational basis for the differential treatment of individuals convicted under Section 303.
Article 21 safeguards life and personal liberty, mandating that deprivation of either can only occur through a procedure established by law. The Court determined that the procedure implied by Section 303, by mandating the death sentence, was neither just nor fair.

The crux of the judgment hinges on several key arguments:

Absence of Rational Classification: The Court found no rational justification to differentiate between individuals who commit murder while serving a life sentence and those who do not. The mandatory death sentence under Section 303 for the former group was deemed arbitrary, particularly considering that life imprisonment is prescribed for 51 offenses in the IPC. The judgment argues that sentencing should consider the circumstances of the crime rather than imposing a standardized punishment.

Violation of Article 21: Citing Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, the Court reiterated that any procedure resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable, not arbitrary or oppressive. The Court considered the mandatory death penalty under Section 303 as "punitively outrageous" and lacking the crucial element of judicial discretion.

Ignoring Mitigating Factors: The Court highlighted the unique pressures faced by convicts serving life sentences, emphasizing that the circumstances leading to a crime committed in such an environment could be exceptional and warrant consideration. The mandatory death penalty under Section 303 disallows any such evaluation, contradicting the principles of fairness and justice.

Lack of Empirical Support: The Court refuted the assumption that life convicts are inherently more dangerous, noting that this belief lacked scientific backing. It referenced studies indicating that the incidence of murders committed by parolees serving life sentences was not alarmingly high, challenging the rationale behind the harsher treatment meted out under Section 303.

Comparison with Section 302: The Court differentiated Section 303 from Section 302, which also addresses punishment for murder. While Section 302 provides the death sentence as an alternative to life imprisonment, Section 303 dictates it as the only punishment. This distinction renders the safeguards and procedural fairness enshrined within Section 302 (the need for special reasons for imposing the death penalty and the right of the accused to be heard on the matter of sentencing) completely absent in Section 303.

The Court examines statistics from the United States, presented in Thorsten Sellin’s The Penalty of Death, which demonstrate that the frequency of murders committed by life convicts on parole is not high enough to justify harsher treatment compared to other murderers. The Court acknowledges the lack of comparable data for India but maintains that there is no basis to treat life convicts differently in the absence of such data.

The apex Court also paid heed to Section 397 of CrPC which states that if a person is already serving one life sentence, then a subsequent sentence has to run concurrently with the previous sentence. The court also stated that including Section 302 there are in total 51 Sections which award the punishment of life imprisonment and without properly analysing the crime, the MENS REA, and the criminal, it will be foolish to award death sentence under Section 303. Opinion of Justice Desai from the Maneka Gandhi Case was also considered in which it was stated “law must be right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.” Which further supported the views of the Bench that proper trial is must to award punishment, and it is necessary to uphold precedent set up in the Bachan Singh case and death penalty should be awarded in rarest of rare cases only.

The Hon'ble Apex Court criticizes the mandatory death sentence prescribed by Section 303 for failing to account for the specific facts and circumstances of individual cases. It emphasizes that judicial discretion, exercised based on well-recognized principles, is crucial for determining appropriate punishment and safeguarding the accused. It further points out the arbitrary nature of Section 303, which mandates the death penalty for murder committed by a person serving a life sentence regardless of the nature of the previous offense. A person sentenced to life imprisonment for forgery, for example, would face a mandatory death sentence for murder, even though there is no logical connection between the two crimes.

The judgment concludes by highlighting the Law Commission of India's recommendations, in its 35th and 42nd reports, to reconsider the mandatory death sentence under Section 303 and its eventual proposal to delete the section altogether in the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill of 1972. Although this bill lapsed due to a change in government, the Court emphasizes the urgent need for these reforms. Ultimately, the Court declares Section 303 unconstitutional, void, and a violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution, emphasizing that all murder cases will now fall under Section 302, eliminating the mandatory death sentence for murder.

Coram: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud and Justice Chinnappa Reddy.
Between: Mithu vs. State of Punjab
Date of Judgment: 07/04/1983