Supreme Court Overturns Separate Trial for MLA, Upholds Joint Trial Principles & Fair Process

While hearing an appeal by Mamman Khan, a sitting MLA from Haryana, the Supreme Court set aside and quashed the Trail Court order directing the seperate chargesheet from that of several co-accused arising out of FIRs (Nos. 149 and 150 of 2023). The appellant MLA challenged the trial court’s decision of split his trial from that of several co-accused where he is arrayed as an accused after the communal violence in Nuh District in July 2023, alleging rioting, arson, dacoity, and conspiracy.

Observing the delays in trial, due to the non-appearance of certain co-accused and citing Khan's status as an MLA, the Trial Court directed the filing of a separate charge sheet against him and ordered his trial to proceed independently, and when the same was challenged, it was subsequently upheld by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

Referring to its earlier ruling in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, the Supreme Court clarified it and held that speedy trials for MPs and MLAs are important; however, the law does not allow separate trials just because the accused is a politician. The Apex Court further held that it does not authorize separate trials based solely on an accused’s political status, nor does it permit deviations from the mandatory legal norms governing joint trials under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Apex Court further observed that the legislative intent behind provisions for joinder of charges and trials is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, avoid conflicting judgments, and promote judicial economy, particularly when offenses arise from the same transaction and involve common evidence, as was evident in the present case.

The Court reiterated the constitutional principle that all accused stand equal before the law (Article 14), and therefore, a legislator’s status cannot, by itself, justify a separate trial or any preferential or adverse procedural treatment. If delays happen because some accused abscond, the Court said, then those cases can be split. But not the case of someone who is appearing regularly.

The Apex Court held that conducting separate trials -where there are identical evidence and common witnesses- would lead to duplication and unwarranted delay, and a significant risk of inconsistent findings and the administrative expediency must operate within the bounds of fairness and cannot compromise fundamental rights or procedural safeguards.

Thus, the Apex Court upheld the mandatory legal norms governing joint trials under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and dismissing separate trials based solely on an accused’s political status, the Supreme Court ultimately found the trial court and High Court's decisions to segregate Khan’s trial to be legally unsustainable.

Additionally, the Apex Court held that the segregation order was passed suo motu (on its own motion) without prior notice or affording the appellant an opportunity of hearing, which constituted a direct violation of procedural fairness and Article 21 of the Constitution.

Coram: Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan.