SC Rules On Starting of Limitation Period For Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

In National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) v. T. Younis (2026 INSC 616), the Supreme Court held that the limitation period for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34(3) must be calculated from the date of disposition of Section 33 request.

Background: During the land acquisition process, effecting the Respondent's land, an award of compension was passed by the competent authority which determined the compensation under Section 3G(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956. The Appellant (NHAI) not being satisfied by the award, invoked the remedy of Arbitration under Section 3G(5)of the 1956 Act and the Arbitrator passed an award on 16.02.2013 redetermining the market value.

However, being not satisfied by the Arbitrators award, the Respondent (landowner) preffered a writ petitioner before the High Court of Karnataka, and the High Court while allowing the writ petition remanded back the matter to de novo consideration for Arbitration. Pursuant to the remand, the Arbitrator conducted fresh proceedings and passed an Award on 03.2.2022.

The dispute arose from land acquisition proceedings in the Bellary District for national highways. After an initial award was remitted by the High Court for fresh consideration, the Arbitrator passed a new award on February 3, 2022, granting enhanced compensation and benefits to the landowner. Both the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) and the landowner subsequently filed applications under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, seeking corrections and additional awards. These applications were eventually dismissed by the Arbitrator through a common order on July 4, 2022.

When NHAI challenged the main award under Section 34 on October 29, 2022, the landowner argued the challenge was time-barred. The High Court of Karnataka agreed, reasoning that NHAI’s Section 33 application was "non-maintainable" because it sought a substantive review rather than simple clerical corrections.

The High Court held that the limitation should be counted from the date of the original award, making NHAI's filing late. However, the Supreme Court set aside this decision.

The Bench, comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe, provided several critical clarifications on the interpretation of the Arbitration Act, ruled that the statute does not distinguish between applications that are allowed, dismissed, or deemed "non-maintainable," thus preventing the clock from starting until the Arbitral Tribunal formally concludes correction proceedings.

The Supreme Court clarified that while an Arbitrator becomes Functus Officio after the final award, Section 33 provides a limited window of jurisdiction for corrections. As long as this window is active, the award remains subject to the Tribunal's limited oversight.

The Apex Court held that oce Section 33 is formally invoked, the limitation for a Section 34 challenge only begins after that specific request is disposed of, regardless of whether it is ultimately successful or even maintainable.

" *18. Even otherwise, the issue involved in the instant appeal is no longer Res integra This Court after examining Sections 33 and 34(3) of the Act has held that for the purposes of computation of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, it is the date of disposal of the application under Section 33 of the Act that would earmark the starting point of limitation for filing an application under Section 34 of the Act.***"**

The Apex Court further rejected the argument that only a "maintainable" application can defer the limitation period. What matters is that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was formally invoked and that the proceedings remained pending; whether the Tribunal eventually finds that no correction is warranted is irrelevant for the purpose of calculating the filing deadline.

Coram: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe.