Supreme Court Mandates 'Strong Suspicion' Test for Discharge When Civil Dispute Subsists
Citing no "strong suspicion" supported by credible material, the Supreme Court of India set aside the Calcutta High Court's refusal to discharge an accused in a case involving Sections 341, 354C, and 506 of the IPC., and held that criminal proceedings cannot continue when allegations arise solely from a pending civil property dispute
While hearing a criminal appeal which challenges the Calcutta High Court's decision of upholding the dismissal of the Appellant-accused's application seeking discharge from charges filed under Sections 341, 354C, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and dischareged the appellant from the charges.
The defacto complainant, Ms. Mamta Agarwal, filed an FIR alleging that the Appellant restrained her entry into a property, intimidated her, and outraged her modesty by clicking her pictures and making videos without consent.
However, this criminal incident was later found to be rooted in a protracted civil dispute between the Appellant's father and his co-owner uncle, Mr. Amalendu Biswas, regarding the property. A pre-existing Civil Court injunction directed the parties to maintain joint possession and restrained the creation of any third-party interest in the property.
The Appellant contended that the complainant, alleged to be a prospective tenant of the uncle, was attempting to enter the property in violation of this subsisting injunction.
The Supreme Court emphasize fundamental principles governing the exercise of power under Section 227 CrP at the stage of discharge, particularly when civil dimensions dominate the facts, and the Apex Court made following observations:
**The Apex Court held that the Trial Court must exercise judicial mind; as it not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution. **
If two views are possible, and one view gives rise to mere suspicion, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Court must discharge the accused. Though, a strong suspicion, that is sufficient for discharge, must be founded on some material that can ultimately be translated into evidence at the stage of trial.
On Voyeurism (Section 354C IPC, Section 77 BNS), the Court categorically held that the FIR and chargesheet did not disclose an offence under Section 354C. The definition of 'Voyeurism' under Section 354C requires watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a ‘private act’, which includes acts performed in circumstances where she reasonably expects privacy, such as exposing genitals or using a lavatory. Since the allegations of clicking pictures did not meet this specific requirement, the charge failed.
For the charge under Section 506 (criminal intimidation/section 351 BNS) was not attracted because the FIR and chargesheet were completely silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with injury to her person or property, beyond a bald allegation of intimidation.
On 'Wrongful Restrain' (Section 341 IPC, Section 126 BNS) the Court found that the offense of wrongful restraint was not made out because the material suggested the complainant was only a prospective tenant and lacked the right to proceed onto the property. Crucially, the Appellant was deemed to be acting in good faith to enforce his lawful right over the property, given the subsisting civil injunction order that restrained the creation of third-party interests.
The Supreme Court emphasized the need for initial filtering to maintain judicial efficiency; of 'Judicial Filtering of Civil Disputes' as where a pending civil dispute exists, the Police and the Criminal Courts must be circumspect in filing chargesheets and framing charges.
The decision to prosecute should be based on the determination that the evidence provides a reasonable prospect of conviction. The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters lacking a strong suspicion clogs the judicial system, diverting resources from serious cases.
While allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court discharged the Appellant-accused from the criminal proceedings, concluding that the allegations in the FIR and the material on record did not disclose the commission of the offenses alleged.
CORAM: JUSTICE NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH AND JUSTICE MANMOHAN.

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