Trial Court's decree was superseded by the Appellate Court's modified decree: SC

The current civil appeal is based on the judgment of the Madras High Court dated 18.01.2018, rejecting a revision petition by the appellant, Raju Naidu, against 'A' and 'B' schedule properties in Pondicherry. The properties were initially purchased by the parents of respondents 1 to 8. The father bought half of 'A' schedule property in 1959 and subsequently gave it to his wife, who possessed the other half, thus becoming the absolute owner. She died in 1976, and respondents 1 to 8 were her legal heirs. In 1977, the father acquired ‘B’ schedule property and executed a Will (Exhibit A7) in 1978 in favor of respondent 9. In 1981, he entered into a sale agreement (Exhibit B1) with the appellant, receiving part payment and granting possession.

Earlier, in 1980, respondent 2 filed a suit for an injunction against the father, partially decreed in 1981. Before his death in 1982, the father executed another Will (Exhibit A8) in favor of respondent 9 for ‘A’ schedule property. Respondents 1 to 8 then filed OS No. 4 of 1983, challenging both Wills and seeking ownership and rent for ‘B’ schedule property.

The High Court ruled that the long-pending revision petition did not amount to inordinate delay and held that Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was inapplicable as the appellant knew of the pending suit. The Supreme Court upheld these findings, affirming that once an appellate decree is passed, it merges with the trial court's decree, irrespective of modification or reversal.

The Supreme Court concurred with these findings, citing the principle that once an Appellate Court passes a decree, the Trial Court's decree merges with it, irrespective of whether it is affirmed, modified, or reversed. The Supreme Court thus dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit.

The primary arguments before the Supreme Court, as raised by the appellant, questioned:

Whether the Executing Court had the authority to allow an extension of time for depositing the advance money, arguing that this amounted to an impermissible modification of the final decree passed by the Trial Court.

Whether there was an inordinate delay in filing the execution petition, contending that it was filed beyond the 12-year period from the date of the original Trial Court decree.

Observations:

The High Court correctly applied the doctrine of merger, stating that the Trial Court's decree was superseded by the Appellate Court's modified decree.

The Executing Court was not precluded from granting extension of time as the decree of the Trial Court had consolidated itself into the decree of the Appellate Court, and the latter did not have a time limit.

The plea of inordinate delay in presenting the execution petition was not accepted because the limitation period was to be reckoned from the date of the Appellate Court's decree, and the revision petition was pending for a considerable period thereafter.

Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was deemed inapplicable based on the fact that the appellant was aware of the then pending suit at the time when he entered into the agreement of sale.

It has always been the holding of the Courts that the rights of a transferee pendente temporis are circumscribed and cannot impinge upon the decree holders' right to enforce the decree.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine that there should never be more than one effective decree regulating the same subject matter at the same time, the Appellate Court's decree overriding the Trial Court's.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's rejection of the revision petition, holding no fault with the High Court's findings and deductions. The primary reasons cited by the appellant were that the extension of time by the Executing Court for the deposit of the advance money was a modification of the decree of the Trial Court and that there was excessive delay in the filing of the execution petitions. The High Court had argued that the doctrine of merger was applicable since the Appellate Court had altered the decree of the Trial Court in 1993. Therefore, the decree of the Trial Court merged with the decree of the Appellate Court, and whether to execute the original decree forthwith was not an issue.

Coram: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Prasanna B. Varale
Between: Raju Naidu vs Chenmouga Sundra & Ors. 2025 INSC 368
Date of Judgment: 19-03-2025