SC Clarifies Scope of Attempted Extortion (Section 387 IPC), Dismisses the Requirement of Property Delivery

The Supreme Court of India overturned a decision by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad which quashed a summoning order and the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 58 of 2022, which had been initiated under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

Background of the Case: The appellant, M/s. Balaji Traders, is a firm owned by Prof. Manoj Kumar Agrawal, engaged in the business of betel nut leaves23. The dispute stems from an ongoing rivalry with Sanjay Gupta, the accused (respondent No. 2), who allegedly commenced a similar business under the same name, leading to pending litigations concerning Trademark and Copyright claims between the parties.

The incident pertaining to this appeal occurred on May 22, 2022, where the complainant, alleged that while he was heading home, the accused, accompanied by three unidentified individuals armed with rifles, intercepted him. They threatened him to cease his betel nut business and demanded a monthly payment of five lakh rupees to continue operating. Upon the complainant's refusal, he was reportedly beaten, and an attempt was made to kidnap him. When the police failed to register a First Information Report (FIR), the complainant approached the court by filing a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Following the complaint, the Trial Court, after reviewing oral and documentary evidence, found a prima facie case against the accused and issued summons under Section 387 IPC6.

The accused then challenged this summoning order before the High Court via a Miscellaneous Application under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court, referencing various judicial pronouncements, observed that a crucial ingredient for an offense of extortion, as defined by Section 383 IPC (Sec 308 BNS), is the actual delivery of property or valuable security under threat. On the sole observation that since no money was handed over to the accused, the High Court concluded that no offense of extortion under Section 383 IPC was made out, and consequently, no offense under Section 387 IPC (Section 30(4) BNS) could be sustained, thus quashing the proceedings.

While analyzing the legal position, particularly concerning the interpretation of extortion and its aggravated forms under the IPC, as well as the principles governing the quashing of criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court observed the following:

Strict Interpretation of Penal Statutes: The Court underscored the fundamental principle that penal statutes must be given a strict interpretation. It emphasized that courts should not read into a statutory provision words that are not present, especially when imposing penal liability. As for the Respondent's reliance on precedents such as Tolaram Relumal and M. Narayanan Nambiar, the Apex Court reiterated that if two reasonable constructions of a penal provision are possible, the one that exempts the subject from penalty should be preferred. The offense charged must be "within the plain meaning of the words used" and "within the letter of the law".

Distinction Between Extortion (Section 383/384 IPC) and Attempts/Preparatory Stages (Sections 385, 387, 389 IPC):

The Supreme Court meticulously reviewed Sections 383 to 389 of the IPC, highlighting the clear legislative distinction between the actual commission of extortion and the acts done "in order to commit extortion".

Section 383 IPC (Section 308 BNS) defines "extortion", for which punishment is provided in Section 384 IPC. Sections 386 and 388 IPC deal with aggravated forms of completed extortion, requiring the actual delivery of property.

Sections 385, 387, and 389 IPC, on the other hand, punish acts committed for the purpose of extortion, even if the act of extortion is not complete and property has not been delivered. These sections criminalize the "process" or a "stage prior to committing an offence of extortion".

The Apex Court explicitly stated that Section 387 IPC is an aggravated form of Section 385 IPC, not Section 384 IPC. Its essential ingredients are: (a) putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt; and (b) doing such an act "in order to commit extortion". The phrase "in order to" signifies "for the purpose of" or "with the purpose of doing".

Crucially, the Apex Court observed that for a prosecution under Section 387 IPC, the delivery of property is not necessary. It cited several precedents, including Radha Ballabh v. State of U.P., Gursharan Singh v. State of Punjab, and Somasundaram v. State, where convictions under Section 387 IPC were upheld despite no actual delivery of money or property.

High Court's Reasoning Was Flawed and Misplaced: The Supreme Court found the High Court's reasoning "on the face of it, flawed and misplaced". The High Court erroneously assigned the essential ingredient of completed extortion (delivery of property under Section 383 IPC) to Section 387 IPC. The Court clarified that Section 387 IPC does not require that extortion be committed; rather, it focuses on the act of putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion. The mere act of putting a person in fear is sufficient for liability under Section 387 IPC; it does not need to satisfy all ingredients of Section 383 IPC.

Improper Reliance on Precedent: The Court noted that the High Court wrongly relied on Dhananjay @ Dhandhanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, as that case dealt with allegations under Section 384 IPC (punishment for extortion), which does require delivery of property, and not Section 387 IPC.

Scope of Quashing Under Section 482 CrPC: The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles governing the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal cases/complaints/FIRs, as laid down in Bhajan Lal and reiterated in B.N. John and Dalip Kaur.... It particularly emphasized the observation from Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases," and not as an ordinary rule. When a prayer for quashing an FIR is made, the Court only has to consider whether the allegations disclose the commission of a cognizable offense, without going into merits or hindering investigation.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court concluded that the instant case was "not fit for quashing". The complaint prima facie disclosed the two essential ingredients for prosecution under Section 387 IPC: (a) the complainant was put in fear of death by a gun being pointed at him; and (b) this act was done to pressurize him into delivering Rs. 5 lakhs. The High Court's emphasis on the non-delivery of money was therefore incorrect. Thus, the Apex Court allowed the appeal and set asided the impugned order of the High Court, thereby, restoring case in the Trial Court.

Coram: JUSTICE SANJAY KAROL & JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA.