Showing 41–60 of 68 terms for letter S
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S
Legal term
Stay Order
Supersedeas (Latin)
Definition
A court order suspending the operation of a lower court's judgment, decree, or order, or halting further proceedings, pending the disposal of an appeal, revision, or other superior court proceeding.
Explanation
A stay order is an order that freezes the legal status quo — it prevents the enforcement or execution of a lower court's order while a challenge to that order is pending. In civil matters, a stay of execution prevents the decree-holder from enforcing the decree (Order XLI Rule 5 CPC). In criminal matters, the High Court may stay a conviction pending appeal (BNSS Section 430). A stay is not granted automatically — the applicant must show prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm if stay is refused. The Supreme Court has emphasised that courts should not grant indefinite stays that effectively nullify lower court orders.
Statutory Provision
Order XLI Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: 'An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree.'
A rule of statutory interpretation requiring that where a statute is penal or takes away vested rights, any ambiguity in its language must be resolved in favour of the person upon whom the burden falls — giving the statute its narrowest permissible reading.
Explanation
Strict construction applies primarily to two categories of statutes: (a) penal (criminal) statutes — where ambiguity is resolved in favour of the accused; and (b) taxing statutes — where the subject cannot be taxed by inference or implication, only by clear words. The rationale: laws that deprive people of liberty or property must speak clearly — the citizen is entitled to know exactly what conduct is prohibited and exactly what taxes are imposed. If the legislature has not clearly included something, it is not included. The Supreme Court has consistently applied strict construction in criminal cases: 'If two constructions of a criminal statute are possible, the one more favourable to the accused must be preferred.'
Statutory Provision
No specific statutory provision mandating strict construction — it is a judge-made principle. Article 20(1) Constitution (no ex post facto criminal law) reflects the strict construction principle's underlying value in criminal law. For tax statutes: the Supreme Court in <em>Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC</em> [1921] 2 KB 403 (English) and adopted in Indian tax law: 'In a taxing statute, one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied.'
Liability for harm caused by the escape of things brought on land that are likely to do mischief — established in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) — without requiring proof of negligence, but subject to recognised exceptions (act of God, act of a stranger, consent, common benefit, statutory authority).
Explanation
Strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 applies when: (a) a person brings onto their land anything likely to do mischief if it escapes; (b) collects and keeps it there; (c) it escapes; and (d) damage results. Liability is 'strict' because no proof of negligence is needed — the mere fact of escape and harm creates liability. However, it is not 'absolute' — the exceptions include: act of God (natural catastrophe beyond control), act of a stranger (third party's unforeseeable act caused the escape), plaintiff's consent, common benefit (the accumulation benefits both the plaintiff and defendant), and statutory authority. In India, Rylands v. Fletcher was the rule until the Supreme Court's M.C. Mehta (1987) created the stricter 'absolute liability' for hazardous enterprises.
Statutory Provision
No specific statutory provision in India — the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is applied as part of English common law tort principles received through the Indian legal system. The rule has been applied by Indian courts in cases involving escape of electricity, water, fire, explosives, chemicals, and other dangerous things. The distinction from absolute liability: absolute liability (M.C. Mehta) applies to hazardous activities and has no exceptions; Rylands v. Fletcher strict liability applies to escape of dangerous things from land and has established exceptions.
Property belonging absolutely to a Hindu woman, including gifts received before and after marriage, over which she has complete dominion and which reverts only to her heirs.
Explanation
Stridhan (Sanskrit: stri = woman, dhana = wealth) is the absolute property of a Hindu woman. It includes gifts received from parents, husband, in-laws, and others, both before and after marriage. A woman has full power to deal with stridhan—she can sell, mortgage, or gift it without her husband's consent. The Supreme Court in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar (1985) held that a husband who misappropriates his wife's stridhan is guilty of criminal breach of trust. Recovery of stridhan is not barred by limitation since the wife is deemed to be a trustee for the husband's family and can reclaim it at any time.
Statutory Provision
Section 14, Hindu Succession Act, 1956: 'Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.'
A decision given 'in silence' — where a point of law was decided (or passed over) without being argued or considered by counsel or the court; such a decision does not create binding precedent on the point passed over in silence.
Explanation
Sub silentio (Latin: 'under silence') is related to per incuriam but distinct from it. A decision is sub silentio on a point when that point was not raised or argued by counsel, not considered by the court, and the court's decision implies rather than states a position on it. The principle: a point of law that was not argued or decided is not a binding precedent on that point, even if the decision logically implies a position on it. The court's silence on a legal point — its failure to consider it — does not bind lower courts. A sub silentio decision might also arise where a court assumed a legal point (without deciding it) and proceeded on that assumption.
Statutory Provision
No statutory provision — sub silentio is a common law doctrine. Article 141 Constitution: 'law declared by the Supreme Court' — only law that was actually considered and declared is binding. The Supreme Court in <em>Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India</em> AIR 1995 SC 1531 distinguished between a binding precedent and a sub silentio decision: a point not argued or considered cannot be treated as settled law.
A person appointed by the original agent to carry out the agent's duties — properly appointed sub-agents bind the principal; improperly appointed ones do not bind the principal but make the original agent liable.
Explanation
A sub-agent under Section 191 ICA is a person employed by and acting under the control of the original agent in the business of the agency. The general rule of agency is 'delegatus non potest delegare' — a delegate cannot further delegate. An agent who has been given personal confidence cannot delegate that authority without the principal's consent. However, when an agent is permitted to appoint a sub-agent (expressly or by implication), the sub-agent is the agent of the principal for all purposes (Section 192). If appointed without authority, the sub-agent is the agent of the original agent alone — the original agent is responsible for the sub-agent's acts and the principal has no direct relationship with the sub-agent.
Statutory Provision
Section 190, Indian Contract Act, 1872: 'An agent must not employ another to perform acts which he has expressly or impliedly undertaken to perform personally; but, if the ordinary custom of trade is to sub-employ, or if it is the nature of the agency so to require, the agent may employ a sub-agent.' Section 191: 'A sub-agent is a person employed by, and acting under the control of, the original agent in the business of the agency.' Section 192: 'Where a sub-agent is properly appointed, the principal is, so far as regards third persons, represented by the sub-agent and is bound by and responsible for his acts, as if he were an agent originally appointed by the principal.'
The substitution of one person in place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right — particularly, the right of a surety who has paid the principal debtor's debt to step into the creditor's shoes and enforce all rights the creditor had against the principal debtor.
Explanation
Subrogation in Indian contract law arises most prominently under Section 140 ICA (surety's rights after payment) and in insurance law. When a surety pays the principal debtor's debt, the surety is entitled to be subrogated to all rights of the creditor against the principal debtor — the surety 'steps into the shoes' of the creditor and can enforce all the same remedies (including securities held by the creditor) to recover from the principal debtor. In insurance, the insurer who pays a claim is subrogated to the insured's rights against the third party who caused the loss — the insured cannot recover from both the insurer and the wrongdoer.
Statutory Provision
Section 140, Indian Contract Act, 1872: 'Where a guaranteed debt has become due, or default of the principal debtor to perform a guaranteed duty has taken place, the surety, upon payment or performance of all that he is liable for, is invested with all the rights which the creditor had against the principal debtor.' This is the statutory right of subrogation for sureties.
A court certificate under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 authorising the holder to collect the debts and securities of a deceased person who died intestate.
Explanation
A succession certificate is granted by a District Court under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Sections 370-390) to the legal heirs of a person who dies intestate (without a will), enabling them to collect the deceased's debts, dividends, and securities. It provides the holder authority to negotiate, transfer, or release securities in the deceased's name. It is distinct from a probate (which validates a will) and letters of administration (which appoint an administrator for the whole estate). Debtors and banks are protected if they pay based on a valid succession certificate.
Statutory Provision
Section 370, Indian Succession Act, 1925: 'When any person dies intestate and any debt or security is vested in him at his death, a District Judge within whose jurisdiction the deceased ordinarily resided may grant to any such person, as in the discretion of such District Judge appears fit, a certificate under this Part.'
A bona fide and adequate reason that satisfies the court that a party's failure to comply with a time limit, procedural requirement, or court order was genuinely excusable — the standard for condonation of delay and setting aside defaults.
Explanation
Sufficient cause is the threshold showing required for many procedural indulgences in Indian civil and criminal law: condonation of delay (Section 5 Limitation Act), setting aside ex parte decrees (Order IX Rule 13 CPC), setting aside abatement (Order XXII Rule 9 CPC), and restoration of dismissed suits. The standard is not rigid — courts apply it contextually. 'Sufficient cause' does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt; it requires a reasonable, plausible, and honestly-given explanation for the failure. The Supreme Court has emphasised that procedural technicalities should not prevent genuine litigants from having their cases heard on merits — courts should lean towards condoning rather than shutting the door.
Statutory Provision
Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963: 'Any appeal or any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.' Order IX Rule 13 CPC: 'the defendant may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree.'
A special expedited civil procedure under Order XXXVII CPC for recovery of liquidated sums of money or specific goods — the defendant must obtain the court's leave to defend the claim; if leave is refused, decree is passed summarily without a full trial.
Explanation
Summary procedure under Order XXXVII of the CPC allows plaintiffs to obtain an early decree for: (a) specified bills of exchange, hundis, or promissory notes; (b) claims arising from sale, supply, or delivery of goods; (c) claims for fixed sums of money on written contracts; and (d) claims arising from guarantees. The defendant in a summary suit cannot simply file a written statement and contest the matter — they must apply for leave to defend. Leave is granted only if the defendant shows the existence of a triable issue or that they genuinely contest the debt. If the defence is fictitious or unsubstantiated, the court may refuse leave and pass summary decree.
Statutory Provision
Order XXXVII Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: 'This Order shall apply to High Courts, City Civil Courts and Courts of Small Causes and to suits of the following nature, namely: (a) suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes; and (b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising — (i) on a written contract, or (ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty.'
