The judicial act of withdrawing or cancelling a previously granted stay order, thereby allowing the stayed proceedings or enforcement to resume.
Explanation
Vacating a stay is the counterpart to granting it — the court cancels the stay order, and the status quo ante the stay is restored. A stay may be vacated: (a) by the party who obtained it (voluntarily, if they no longer need it); (b) by the court on its own motion (if the grounds for stay have changed); or (c) on an application by the opposite party showing that the stay was wrongly obtained, the conditions have changed, or the applicant is abusing the stay. Under the Asian Resurfacing ruling, interim stays automatically expire after 6 months unless explicitly renewed.
Statutory Provision
Order XXXIX Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: 'Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court which granted it, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied therewith.' [Applies mutatis mutandis to stays]
The liability of one person for the tortious acts of another — typically an employer's liability for wrongs committed by employees in the course of their employment — based on the principle 'let the master answer' (respondeat superior).
Explanation
Vicarious liability operates through the maxim 'respondeat superior' (let the superior/master answer): an employer is liable for torts committed by their employee if the tort was committed in the course of the employment. The employer's liability is 'vicarious' because they are held liable for another's wrong — their own culpability lies in having employed the tortfeasor and (in the case of negligent employment) in having selected them poorly. Key elements: (a) employer-employee relationship; (b) the tort was committed in the course of employment — not on a 'frolic of his own.' An employee acting for purely personal purposes (outside the employment scope) takes the employer outside vicarious liability.
Statutory Provision
No specific statutory provision — vicarious liability is a common law tort doctrine. Section 238, Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for principal-agent): 'Misrepresentations made, or frauds committed, by agents acting in the course of their business for their principals, have the same effect on agreements made by such agents as if such misrepresentations or frauds had been made or committed by the principals.' This is a statutory embodiment of vicarious liability in the agency context.
A person who has suffered any loss, injury, harm, or damage to their person, property, or dignity as a result of the commission of an offence — with specific statutory rights under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
Explanation
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 significantly strengthened victim rights compared to the old CrPC. Key victim rights under BNSS: (a) Section 17(3) — victim's right to be heard before bail is granted to the accused in serious offences; (b) Section 176(3) — victim's right to be represented by their own advocate in all stages of trial (not only a government prosecutor); (c) Section 396 — victim compensation scheme entitlement; (d) right to know the progress of investigation through mandatory status reports (Section 193(3)); and (e) right to appeal against acquittal in certain cases. Victims of sexual offences and trafficking have enhanced protections including identity protection and private-in-camera trial.
Statutory Provision
Section 2(1)(y), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023: 'victim means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression victim includes his or her guardian or legal heir.' (Substantially same as former CrPC Section 2(wa) inserted in 2009.)
A court-directed or State-administered monetary award to victims of crime to rehabilitate and compensate them for loss and injury suffered, regardless of the conviction of the accused.
Explanation
Victim compensation in India operates through two pathways: (a) BNSS Section 396 (formerly CrPC Section 357) allows courts to order compensation from the fine imposed on a convicted person; and (b) BNSS Section 397 (formerly CrPC Section 357A) mandates every State to prepare a Victim Compensation Scheme (VCS) for rehabilitation of victims of crime, especially where the offender is not traceable or convicted and the victim has suffered significant loss. The Supreme Court in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (2019) directed States to implement VCS for sexual offence victims within defined timelines.
Statutory Provision
Section 396, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: 'When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied in payment of compensation to any person for any loss or injury caused to him by the offence.'
An agreement that is not enforceable by law from the outset — it creates no legal rights or obligations, is void ab initio, and cannot be converted into a valid contract by subsequent conduct or ratification.
Explanation
A void agreement under Section 2(g) ICA is one that 'is not enforceable by law.' In contrast to a voidable contract (which is valid until avoided), a void agreement has no legal effect from the start — no rights, no obligations, no legal remedy for breach. Void agreements under the Indian Contract Act include: agreements by persons without capacity (Section 11 — minor, person of unsound mind), agreements without consideration or the consideration/object is unlawful (Section 23-24), agreements in restraint of trade (Section 27), agreements in restraint of legal proceedings (Section 28), uncertain agreements (Section 29), wagering agreements (Section 30), and agreements to do impossible acts (Section 56).
Statutory Provision
Section 2(g), Indian Contract Act, 1872: 'An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void.' Section 2(j): 'A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable.' (Distinguishes initially void from subsequently void.)
The maxim 'to one who is willing, no injury is done' — a defence in tort law that a plaintiff who voluntarily consents to and assumes the risk of a particular danger cannot recover damages for harm resulting from that risk.
Explanation
Volenti non fit injuria (Latin: 'to one who is willing, no injury is done') is a complete defence in tort law: if the plaintiff freely and knowingly consented to the risk of harm from the defendant's act, the defendant is not liable for resulting harm. Elements: (a) the plaintiff had knowledge of the specific risk; (b) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed that specific risk; (c) the risk materialised and caused the harm. The defence is narrow: mere knowledge of risk is not consent to it ('scienti non fit injuria' — to one who knows, no injury is done — is a weaker principle); the plaintiff must have both known AND freely consented.
Statutory Provision
No specific statutory provision — volenti is a common law tort defence. Section 23, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 (necessity exception) and Section 21 BNS (consent exception in criminal law) embody the broader principle that consent affects liability. In civil negligence, volenti is a complete defence when proved — though courts have been reluctant to apply it in employment cases (where economic necessity may vitiate 'free' consent) and consumer cases.
Doing an act by the free exercise of one's will, including all natural and probable consequences that a person of ordinary prudence would know are likely to follow from the act.
Explanation
Under Section 2(43) of the BNS 2023 (formerly IPC Section 39), a person is said to cause an effect voluntarily when they cause it by means they knew or had reason to believe would produce it, or when they intended to cause it through those means. The definition extends liability beyond direct and intended consequences to foreseeable consequences—bringing the doctrine of constructive liability into Indian penal law. It operates alongside Section 6 BNS (knowledge of consequences), making voluntary acts the basis of criminal liability when the natural outcome of the act was foreseen or ought to have been foreseen.
Statutory Provision
Section 2(43), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly IPC Section 39): 'A person is said to cause an effect voluntarily when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.'